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ABSTRACT
The large availability of repositories storing various types of in-
formation about individuals has raised serious privacy concerns
over the last ten years. Yet database technology is far from pro-
viding adequate solutions to this problem that requires a delicate
balance between individual’s privacy and convenience and data
usability by enterprises and organizations - a database which is
rigid and over-protective may render data of little value. Though
those goals may seem odd, we claim that the development of solu-
tions able to reconcile them will be an important challenge to be
addressed in the next few years. We believe that the next-wave
of database technology will be represented by DBMS providing
high-assurance privacy and security. In this paper, we elaborate
on such challenges. In particular, we claim that we need to pro-
vide diﬀerent views of data at a very ﬁne level of granularity;
conventional view technology is able to select only up to a single
attribute value for a single tuple. We need to go beyond such
level; we need a mechanism by which even a single value inside a
tuple’s attribute may have diﬀerent views - which we refer to as
micro-views. We believe that such a mechanism can be an impor-
tant building block, together with other mechanisms and tools,
of next-wave database technology.
1. INTRODUCTION
Current information technology enables many organiza-
tions to collect, store and use a vast amount of personal in-
formation in their databases. The use of innovative knowl-
edge extraction techniques combined with advanced data
integration and correlation techniques [7] makes it possible
to automatically extract a large body of information from
the available databases and from a large variety of infor-
mation repositories available on the web. Such a wealth of
information and extracted knowledge raises, however, seri-
ous concerns about the privacy of individuals. As privacy
awareness increases, individuals are becoming more reluc-
tant to carry out their businesses and transactions online,
and many enterprises are losing a considerable amount of
potential proﬁts [11]. Also, enterprises that collect infor-
mation about individuals are in eﬀect under the obligations
of keeping them private and must strictly control the use of
such information in order to avoid potential law suits. Thus,
information stored in the databases of an enterprise is no
longer a valuable property of the enterprise, but a costly
responsibility. Consequently, the development of data man-
agement techniques providing high-assurance privacy and at
the same time avoiding unnecessary restrictions to data ac-
cesses is a crucial need. We need to combine the individuals’
right to privacy with the need by many enterprises of car-
rying on information analysis and knowledge extraction. In
many cases, such knowledge is used to provide better and
tailored services to individuals.
To date issues related to privacy have been widely inves-
tigated and several privacy protecting techniques have been
developed. The most well known eﬀort is the W3C’s Plat-
form for Privacy Preference (P3P) [18]. P3P allows websites
to encode their privacy policy in a machine readable format
so that consumers can easily compare the published pri-
vacy policies against their privacy preferences. P3P, how-
ever, does not provide any functionality to enforce these
promises to the internal privacy practice of enterprises. To
complement P3P’s lack of enforcement mechanisms, many
privacy-aware access control models have also been inves-
tigated [3, 4, 8, 9]. Although all these models do protect
privacy of data providers
1, they are very rigid and do not
provide ways to maximize the utilization of private informa-
tion. Speciﬁcally, in those models access decision is always
binary; i.e., access is either allowed or denied as in most
conventional access control models.
We believe that a new generation of privacy-aware access
control models is required to be able to maximize informa-
tion use by exploiting the nature of information privacy.
First of all, information privacy is context-speciﬁc. For in-
stance, consider address data of consumers. The comfort
level of individuals toward the possibility of their address
being used for marketing is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
case when the address information is to be used for shipping.
Furthermore, the level of comfort varies from individual to
individual. Some consumers may feel that it is acceptable to
disclose their purchase history or browsing habits in return
for better service; others may feel that disclosing such infor-
mation may lead to an invasion to their privacy. These dif-
ferences in individual privacy measures suggest that access
control models should be able to cater to a large variation in
privacy preferences and to maximize the use of information
by taking these preferences into account.
Second, the use of data generalization
2 can signiﬁcantly
increase privacy comfort level of data providers. For exam-
ple, suppose that an enterprise collects annual incomes of its
consumers. This is indeed sensitive information, and many
individuals may not be comfortable in letting this informa-
1By data providers, we refer to the subjects to whom the
stored data is related.
2Data generalization refers to techniques that “replace a
value with a less speciﬁc but semantically consistent value”
[15].Term Description Example
Privacy level Level of privacy required by data provider Low, Medium, High
Data type Types of data being collected Name, Address, Income, Age
Data usage type Types of potential data usage (i.e. purpose) Marketing, Admin, Shipping
Table 1: Privacy level, data type and data usage type
tion to be used. Suppose now that the enterprise promises
its consumers that the income information will be general-
ized before being used; e.g., $123,345 will be generalized to
a categorical value $100-150K. This assurance will be surely
more comforting to many consumers even though individual
reactions may vary. Clearly, privacy enhancing access con-
trol models should be able to better utilize information by
employing data generalization techniques.
The development of DBMS able to address the above re-
quirements is a challenging task, requiring revisiting theo-
retical foundations of data models as well as languages and
architectures. A core DBMS component which is crucial
in such context is represented by the access control sys-
tem. Current access control systems are fundamentally in-
adequate with respect to the above goals. For example, ﬁne-
grained access control to data, an important requirement for
privacy, poses several diﬃcult problems and to date no sat-
isfactory solution exists. We have yet to understand which
the relevant technical requirements are.
In this paper, we pose as a new challenge the develop-
ment of a new generation of access control systems. As an
example, we propose a radically new access control model
able to exploit the subtle nature of information privacy to
maximize the usability of private information for enterprises
with privacy guarantees. Our model has not to be consid-
ered as a complete solution; rather it is meant to show some
of capabilities that, in our opinion, a suitable model should
provide. In particular, our model is based on the notion of
micro-view. A micro-view applies the well known idea of
views at the level of the atomic components of tuples, that
is, to attribute’s values. By using these diﬀerent values,
one is able to ﬁnely calibrate the amount of precision in the
information released by queries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we present a high-level description of our access
control model, and some technical challenges imposed by our
model are discussed in Section 3. We provide a brief survey
of related work in Section 4 and conclude our discussion in
Section 5.
2. A SKETCH OF OUR “NAIVE” MODEL
Our model is based on what we could consider a typical
“life-cycle” of data concerning individuals. During the data
collection phase, data providers specify the level of privacy
they require for their data and the type of possible usage
of these data. Such user’s preferences are then stored in
the database along with data; access and use of the data
is strictly controlled according to the user’s preferences. In
particular, in our model, answers to queries may have dif-
ferent precisions, depending on the privacy requirements for
the data and the purpose of the query. The diﬀerent preci-
sion levels are obtained by using diﬀerent micro-views of the
data. In this section, we ﬁrst illustrate how data collection
process is carried out in our model and what type of data
preprocessing is required to support our model. Then we
discuss our access control model more in details.
2.1 Data collection and preprocess
As previously mentioned, data providers specify the level
of privacy they require for each type of data and each type
of possible data usage when they release their personal in-
formation. Thus, enterprises must clearly deﬁne, based on
the pre-established privacy policy, the levels of privacy, the
types of data collected and the types of data usage (i.e.,
purposes) and make their consumers aware of such options.
Table 1 describes these concepts and provides some exam-
ples.
Although any arbitrary number of privacy levels is possi-
ble, to ease the illustration we will limit the level of privacy
to three levels in this paper: Low, Medium and High. We
also consider only name, address and income as data types
and admin and marketing as data usage types in our dis-
cussion for the same reason.
Data providers specify privacy requirements for their in-
formation by specifying a privacy level for each data type
and each data usage. For instance, a consumer may se-
lect Low on Address for Admin, which means that he/she
does not have any privacy concern over the address infor-
mation when it is used for administrative purpose. Thus,
the address information can be used for such purpose as it
is. However, the same consumer may select High on Address
for Marketing. This indicates that he/she has great concerns
about privacy of the address information when it is used for
marketing purpose; thus, the address information should be
used only in a suﬃciently generalized form
4.
While speciﬁed privacy requirements are stored into database,
the actual data items are preprocessed before being stored
in the following way. Each data is generalized and stored
according to a multilevel organization, where each level cor-
responds to a speciﬁc privacy level. Intuitively, data for a
higher privacy level requires a higher degree of generaliza-
tion. For instance, the address data is stored into three
levels: detailed address for Low, city and state for Medium
and state for High.
Table 2 illustrates some ﬁctional records and privacy re-
quirements stored in a “conceptual” database relation. No-
tice that every data is stored in three diﬀerent generaliza-
tion levels, each of which corresponds to a privacy level.
PL Admin and PL Marketing are metadata columns
5 stor-
ing the set of privacy levels of data for Admin and Market-
ing, respectively. For instance, {L, L, M} in PL marketing
indicates that the privacy levels of Name and Address are
both Low while the privacy level of Income is Medium.
Note that exactly how such data is organized and stored in
4Note that if one wishes to allow data providers to com-
pletely opt out from any use of data, another privacy level
(e.g., Opt-out) can be added to indicate that the particular
data should not be used in any circumstance.
5The metadata columns may be viewable to any user, but
they should be modiﬁable to only authorized users.CustID
3 Name Address Income PL Admin PL Marketing
1001
L Alice Park L 123 First St., Seattle, WA L 45,000
{L, M, H} {H, H, H} M Alice P. M Seattle, WA M 40K-60K
H A.P. H WA H Under 100K
1002
L Aaron Parker L 491 3rd St, Lafayette, IN L 121,000
{L, L, M} {H, M, H} M Aaron P. M Lafayette, IN M 120K-140K
H A.P. H IN H Over 100K
1003
L Carol Jones L 35 Oval Dr, Chicago, IL L 64,000
{L, L, L} {L, M, H} M Carol J. M Chicago, IL M 60K-80K
H C.J. H IL H Under 100K
Table 2: Private information and metadata
databases is a crucial issue as it determines the performance
and storage eﬃciency of a system. However, this issue is
beyond the scope of this paper and not discussed further
here.
2.2 Access Control
In our model, users query the database using SQL state-
ments. However, the data accessible to each query varies
depending on the privacy levels of the data and the purpose
of the query
6. That is, each query runs as if it is running on
a view that is deﬁned by the purpose of the query and the
privacy levels of data. We call such views as privacy views.
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate this eﬀect. For instance, any query
against the base table in Table 2 with Admin purpose will
return a result that is equivalent to the result of the query
run on the privacy view in Table 3. As the privacy views
directly reﬂect the information that is allowed by each data
provider, querying against these views does not violate pri-
vacy.
Note that the major diﬀerence of our model from conven-
tional database models is that in our model, diﬀerent sets of
data may be returned for the same query, depending on the
privacy levels of data and the purpose of the query. For in-
stance, suppose that the following query is written against
the base table in Table 2: “SELECT * FROM Customer
WHERE CustID = 1002”. If the purpose of this query is
Admin, then the system will return a tuple  ‘Aaron Parker’,
‘491 3rd St, Lafayette, IN’, ‘120K-140K’  as Aaron’s privacy
levels for Admin are speciﬁed as {L, L, M}. On the other
hand, if the purpose of the query is Marketing, then a tuple
 ‘A. P.’, ‘Lafayette, IN’, ‘Over 100K’  will be retrieved as
his privacy levels for Marketing is {H, M, H}.
Another important issue to be addressed is how to asso-
ciate a particular purpose with each query. In fact, it is al-
most impossible to correctly infer the purpose of a query as it
means that the system must correctly ﬁgure out the real in-
tention of database users. However, if we assume that users
are trusted, then the problem of associating a purpose with
each query becomes relatively easy; i.e., users themselves
can specify the purpose of their queries with an additional
clause
7. For instance, a simple select statement “SELECT
name FROM customer” can be extended to a form of “SE-
LECT name FROM customer FOR marketing”. In fact, this
is not a ﬂawed assumption at all. Many privacy violations
may occur from accidentally accessing unauthorized infor-
mation, and thus it is important to protect database users
from committing such accidental violations.
6For now, assume that each query is associated with a spe-
ciﬁc purpose.
7A more sophisticated approach which validates whether
users are indeed authorized to use their claimed purposes
is thoroughly investigated in [5].
CustID Name Address Income
1001 Alice Park Seattle Under 100K
1002 Aaron Parker 491 3rd St, Lafayette, IN 120K-140K
1003 Carol Jones 35 Oval Dr, Chicago, IL 64,000
Table 3: Privacy-view for Admin purpose
CustID Name Address Income
1001 A. P. WA Under 100K
1002 A. P. Lafayette, IN Over 100K
1003 Carol Jones Chicago, IL Under 100K
Table 4: Privacy-view for Marketing purpose
3. CHALLENGES
The full development of the approach we have sketched in
the previous section and its integration in a DBMS archi-
tecture requires addressing several interesting challenges.
Policy speciﬁcation language. The core of our model
is that data providers can specify their privacy requirements
using a privacy level for each data category. There is thus
a strong need for a language in which privacy speciﬁcations
can be precisely expressed. A challenge is that the language
must be powerful enough to express every possible require-
ment, yet simple enough to avoid any ambiguity or conﬂict.
Thus usability is a crucial issue. Especially as we cannot
assume that every data provider would be an expert in pri-
vacy or any type of technology, GUI tools that are intuitive
and instructive must be provided for them. We believe that
many valuable lessons can be learned from existing technol-
ogy related to P3P and APPEL [18, 17] and previous work
on user interaction design [19]. It is important that data
providers have a clear understanding of the guarantees pro-
vided by each privacy level.
Data generalization. Needless to say, devising a quality
data generalization technique is one of the key challenges.
There are two important issues to be considered here. The
ﬁrst issue is that the generalization process must preserve
meaningful information from actual data as inadequate in-
formation would not be of any use. For example, although
numeric or structured data may be relatively easy to be gen-
eralized into multi-levels that are meaningful, it is unclear
how unstructured data (e.g., textual data) should be gener-
alized into multi-levels. We need also to devise generaliza-
tion policies and ontologies supporting systematic and con-
sistent data generalization across the database. The other
important issue is that generalization process must produce
a suﬃcient level of data privacy by eﬀectively suppressing
distinctive information in individual data. For instance, con-
sider name information of individuals. There are certainnames that are more infrequent than others, and inade-
quate generalization techniques would not be able to hide
the uniqueness of such names. Moreover, if the content of
database dynamically changes, the task of distinct informa-
tion hiding becomes much more challenging. Clearly, a big
challenge in data generalization is to well balance the trade-
oﬀ between information preservation and information sup-
pression. Generalization must also be eﬃciently performed;
in many cases, the system will have to perform data gen-
eralization “on the ﬂy” while processing a query; in other
cases, a privacy post-processing of queries will be required,
because what has to be returned may depend on for exam-
ple the cardinality and statistics of the results as well as on
past accesses. Many valuable lessons can be learned from
various generalization techniques that are available in sta-
tistical databases [1]. The main challenge here is that these
techniques may have to be used dynamically in a variety of
settings, ranging from data storage to query processing.
Metrics for data privacy and data quality and us-
ability. So far, we have claimed that both privacy and
usability of data can be achieved when data is suﬃciently
generalized. However, the key question is: how can we de-
termine whether or not a certain generalization strategy pro-
vides a suﬃcient level of privacy and usability? As one can
generalize data in various ways and degrees, we need met-
rics that methodologically measures privacy and usability of
generalized data. It is clear that such metrics are necessary
to devise generalization techniques that can satisfy the re-
quirements of both data providers and data users.
Metadata storage. In our “naive model” we have as-
sumed that collected data is generalized and stored into var-
ious levels at the preprocessing stage. This approach is sim-
ple and eﬀective, yet may require huge storage space. For
instance, suppose there are n numbers of privacy levels in a
system. This means that the required storage space would
be n times larger than the size of the collected data. An-
other approach is to postpone the generalization process to
the time of data access. This method does not require any
additional storage and also helps reducing unnecessary data
generalization
8. However, the overall performance may sig-
niﬁcantly suﬀer. Another possible solution is to use both
pre-generalization and post-generalization selectively. For
example, only data that are expected to be frequently ac-
cessed are pre-generalized and stored. Then other data that
are not pre-processed should be generalized when they are
actually accessed. Also, for better performance the post-
generalized data may be cached in a special space. Using
this approach, one can try to reduce the overall cost of gen-
eralization process. However, a challenge here is to balance
the trade-oﬀ between storage and performance. Yet another
approach could be based on the use of views, which would
have to be extended with innovative capabilities for value
generation and transformation.
Complex query processing. In this paper we have con-
sidered only simple queries; i.e., queries without join, sub-
query or aggregation. The key question here is whether com-
8Note that data items are not equally accessed. That is,
some data items are accessed much more frequently than
the others. It is also reasonable to assume that some data
items are rarely accessed.
plex queries can be introduced in our model. Even though
it seems that they can be correctly processed in the model,
it is not clear whether the results of such queries would be
still meaningful.
Applicability to general-purpose access control. Al-
though we have limited our discussion to access control for
privacy protection, we believe it is possible to extend our
model to a general-purpose access control model. For in-
stance, each user can be assigned to a trust level
9, and
the access control system can control, based on user’s trust
level, degrees of precision on accessible information. This
approach is indeed very similar to multilevel secure database
systems [14, 12, 6], where every piece of information is classi-
ﬁed into a security level and every user is assigned a security
clearance. However, the main diﬀerence is that our approach
can provide much ﬁner level of control as access control de-
cision is based on the question of “how much information
can be allowed for a certain user”, rather than “is informa-
tion allowed for a certain user or not”. This type of ﬁner
grained access control can be extremely useful for internal
access control within an organization as well as information
sharing between organizations. Even though such extension
seems very promising at this point, further investigation is
required to conﬁrm this possibility.
Other issues. There are many other issues that require
careful investigation, such as problems of polyinstantiation
[13, 10], inference and integrity. Addressing such issues is
also crucial for the development of comprehensive access
control models for high-assurance privacy.
4. RELATED WORK
To date, several approaches have been reported dealing
with various aspects of the problem of high-assurance pri-
vacy systems. Here we brieﬂy discuss the approaches that
have provided some initial solutions that can certainly be
generalized and integrated into comprehensive solutions to
such problem.
The W3C’s Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P) [18]
allows web sites to encode their privacy practice, such as
what information is collected, who can access the data for
what purposes, and how long the data will be stored by the
sites, in a machine-readable format. P3P enabled browsers
can read this privacy policy automatically and compare it
to the consumer’s set of privacy preferences which are spec-
iﬁed in a privacy preference language such as A P3P Pref-
erence Exchange Language (APPEL) [17], also designed by
the W3C.
The concept of Hippocratic databases, incorporating pri-
vacy protection within relational database systems, was in-
troduced by Agrawal et al. [2]. The proposed architecture
uses privacy metadata, which consist of privacy policies and
privacy authorizations stored in two tables. A privacy pol-
icy deﬁnes for each attribute of a table the usage purpose(s),
the external-recipients and retention period, while a privacy
authorization deﬁnes which purposes each user is authorized
to use.
Byun et al. presented a comprehensive approach for pri-
9The trust level will not be chosen by users, but assigned to
users by authorized personnel.vacy preserving access control based on the notion of pur-
pose [4, 5]. In the model, purpose information associated
with a given data element speciﬁes the intended use of the
data element, and the model allows multiple purposes to be
associated with each data element. The granularity of data
labeling is fully discussed in details in [4], and a systematic
approach to implement the notion of access purposes, using
roles and role-attributes is presented in [5].
Previous work on multilevel secure relational databases [6,
12, 14] also provides many valuable insights for designing a
ﬁne-grained secure data model. In a multilevel relational
database system, every piece of information is classiﬁed into
a security level, and every user is assigned a security clear-
ance. Based on this access class, the system ensures that
each user gains access to only the data for which he has
proper clearance, according to the basic restrictions. These
constraints ensure that there is no information ﬂow from
a lower security level to a higher security level and that
subjects with diﬀerent clearances see diﬀerent versions of
multilevel relations.
In order to prevent re-identiﬁcation of anonymized data,
Sweeney introduced the notion of k-anonymity [16]. K-
anonymity requires that information about each individual
in a data release be indistinguishable from at least k-1 other
individuals with respect to a particular set of attributes.
Sweeney also proposed a technique using generalization and
suppression of data to achieve k-anonymity with minimal
distortion [15].
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed a new approach to access con-
trol that maximizes the usability of private information for
enterprises while, at the same time, assuring privacy. We
believe that one direction for next-generation DBMS tech-
nology is represented by DBMS with high-assurance security
and privacy. The “naive” model we presented in the paper
provides an example of an access control system for such a
new DBMS. Based on this model, we discussed many chal-
lenges that need to be addressed. We would like to con-
clude the paper by saying that ultimately a suitable so-
lution to access control systems with high-privacy assur-
ance will be built by integrating techniques such as view
mechanisms, statistical databases, anonymization, privacy-
preserving computation and data mining. The main chal-
lenge is how to integrate such techniques in a full-ﬂedged
DBMS ensuring good performance.
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